The Town of Turbeville is headed back to Clarendon County Common Pleas Court this month to deal once again with its Town Council-approved Traffic Ordinance.
This time, however, the town will not be fighting the two plaintiffs who filed the original lawsuit in May 2016 alleging that the town has collected money illegally through its ordinance, which states “it shall be unlawful for any person to fail to obey the traffic ordinances of the Town of Turbeville and the state of South Carolina while operating a motor vehicle within the town limits.”
The ordinance specifically calls for fines of up to $500, plus court fees, for those violating the law, which was originally passed May 13, 2003, and amended Aug. 11, 2009.
Plaintiffs Rebecca Robbins and Marie Babayan claim they were both fined during separate stops in the small town with a population of a little more than 800 in excess of what state law allows. Their attorneys allege that their individual fines were in excess of those that would have been imparted under typical state law.
But Robbins’ and Babayan’s claims themselves are not the crux of a hearing that will be held 9:30 a.m. June 5 at the Clarendon County Courthouse.
Instead, the town’s attorneys - which include Manning attorney William H. Johnson - will argue that, should the town lose the lawsuit filed by Robbins and Babayan, that the state Department of Revenue should return any and all monies given to it from fines paid by each person ticketed for violation of the Town Traffic Ordinance.
Turbeville filed “third-party” claims in December 2016, making the state a defendant in the case and “seeking refund or restitution of those state-mandated assessments in the event the Town Traffic Ordinance, or the manner in which the ordinance is enforced, is deemed to be unconstitutional, illegal or unenforceable.”
The state argues, however, that there is no provision in state law for a municipal court such as Turbeville to recover overpayments or incorrect payments of the mandatory fees and assessments. It further argues that such funds have already been spent, and that the General Assembly would have to enact new laws to make such a remedy possible for the town of Turbeville.
“It ought to require neither argument nor authority to support the proposition, that, where the money of an innocent person like the town has gone into the coffers of the state, such money or property cannot be held by the state without recourse,” reads a motion filed by the town’s attorneys in March.
In its motion to dismiss, the state notes that Turbeville complies with state law in “remitting payment for mandatory surcharges and assessments for the Victim’s Compensation Fund; the conviction charge; the Criminal Justice Academy fee; and the mandatory assessment of 107.5 percent of the base fine from the fine paid by each person ticketed for violation of the Town Traffic Ordinance.”
In making its claim that the state should be dismissed as a defendant in the case, the state argues that it did not adopt Turbeville’s Traffic Ordinance.
“Turbeville did,” reads an answer in support of the state’s motion to dismiss filed April 6. “The state did not charge and convict motorists under those ordinances resulting in assessments under (said statutes). Turbeville did. The surcharges and assessments resulted solely from the voluntary acts of Turbeville in convicting motorists under its ordinance.”
The state argued that existing case law involving Charleston City Council “shows that a payment of that which could not have been legally required, if done in ignorance of the law, was a voluntary payment, and could not be recovered back.”
“If the ordinance under which convictions were obtained ‘could not have been legally required,’ then Turbeville has been paying the state monies resulting solely from its voluntary activities in bringing illegal charges,” the state alleges. “Those monies cannot be recovered back.”
The state also argues that Turbeville was on “prior notice” due to opinions from both the state Attorney General’s Office and that of the state Treasurer’s Office that its ordinances were possibly not in accordance with state laws.
The Attorney General’s Office’s opinion stated the belief “that local ordinances regulating traffic are void as in conflict with state law if such ordinances regulate traffic in the same manner as any provision of the Uniform Traffic Act without express statutory authorization to do so; impose greater or lesser penalties for traffic violations than those set forth by the UTA; or impose a civil fine as opposed to the criminal penalties prescribed by the UTA, thereby circumventing the criminal tracking and point system the legislature intended to be used for traffic violations.”
Babayan and Robbins argued in their initial filings that the town does not assess points against drivers charged under its traffic ordinance, instead allowing the payment of a higher penalty. The state thus argues that, should the town’s ordinance be ruled unconstitutional by the court, then Turbeville should be held liable to the plaintiffs, not the state. Likewise, the state should not be held liable to the town of Turbeville for the latter’s remittance of said payments under its traffic ordinance.
“If the ordinances are found invalid in this case, the town was on prior notice in the opinions of the Attorney General,” the state argued. “When the town continued to write tickets under the ordinance and pay in monies to the treasurer after the opinions were written, it did so knowing that the ordinances might be void.”
The state, finally, cites the “doctrine of unclean hands,” noting that plaintiffs cannot recover in equity if they acted unfairly in a matter that is the subject of the litigation to the prejudice of the defendant. In other words, Turbeville, if deemed to have acted unfairly, can’t then gain indemnity from the state and recover its losses to pay back plaintiff’s claims.
“Turbeville cannot write tickets knowing they might be invalid and then, if it loses this suit, recover fees and assessments paid over to the state,” the state’s motion said.
